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Abstract
As deep neural networks (DNNs) have become increas-
ingly important and popular, the robustness of DNNs is the
key to the safety of both the Internet and physical world.
Unfortunately, some recent studies show that adversarial
examples, which are hard to be distinguished from real ex-
amples, can easily fool DNNs and manipulate their pre-
dictions. Upon observing that adversarial examples are
mostly generated by gradient-based methods, in this pa-
per, we first propose to use a simple yet very effective non-
differentiable hybrid model that combines DNNs and ran-
dom forests, rather than hide gradients from attackers, to
defend against the attacks. Our experiments show that our
model can successfully and completely defend the white-box
attacks, has a lower transferability, and is quite resistant to
three representative types of black-box attacks; while at the
same time, our model achieves similar classification accu-
racy as the original DNNs. Finally, we investigate and sug-
gest a criterion to define where to grow random forests in
DNNs.
1. Introduction
Despite being remarkably effective in solving many real-
world problems such as the perception of images, videos,
and texts, Deep neural networks (DNNs) are surprisingly
vulnerable to adversarial attacks: one can easily fool the
networks and manipulate their predictions by generating ad-
versarial examples that are only slightly different from the
real examples for which the networks usually give rise to
correct predictions [29]. While at the same time, DNNs are
widely applied to many critical real-life applications, such
as self-driving cars, robotics, and Internet of Things, it is
vital to improve their robustness against adversarial attacks.
In the state-of-the-art adversarial attacking methods, gra-
dients are the key ingredient to perturb a normal example to
an adversarial one. These methods include white-box at-
tacks [14, 14], which assume that attackers have full knowl-
edge of the DNNs being attacked, including the architecture
and weights of the DNNs and, even the training data and
gradients during training. In like manner, black-box attack-
ing algorithms [28, 21] allow attackers access to nothing
but the DNNs’ outputs (e.g. classification prediction prob-
abilities) which are usually used to estimate the gradients.
Thus recent defense strategies focus on preventing the at-
tackers from inferring the gradients. As summarized in [1],
defense methods often use shattered gradients [6], design
stochastic gradients, or intentionally vanishing/exploding
gradients [31]. But since these methods are in the nutshell
of training with back-propagation, it essentially opens the
door to attackers. The gradient-based attack could still suc-
ceed as long as they find a way to obtain or approximate the
correct gradients, which seems feasible in most cases [1].
In this paper, we open a novel direction for defend-
ing against gradient-based attacking models by introduc-
ing non-differentiable algorithms into DNNs. We propose a
simple, intuitive yet effective method to transform a fragile
DNN classifier into a more robust one. We present a hy-
brid approach that we transform the last few layers of DNNs
classifiers into random forests that are non-differentiable at
all so that the gradients cannot been approximated. Our
proposed technique is very flexible for easily marrying
the strength of the representation power of DNNs as fea-
ture extractor and the security property thanks to the non-
differentiability of random forests.
Extensive experiments on several DNN classificaton
models including AlexNet [18], VGG-16 [30], and MNIST-
net [7] show the effectiveness of our method against some
popular attacking algorithms such as C&W model [7]
for white-box attacks and Zeroth Order Optimization
(ZOO) [8] for black-box attacks. White-box attack meth-
ods fail to attack our hybrid deep model because the last
few layers are not differentiable at all. Furthermore, most
previous defense methods suffer from failing to defend the
transferability of adversarial examples. We show that our
approach using random forests leverages the problem. On
the other hand, black-box attacks also find it hard to attack
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
06
76
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
6 J
un
 20
19
such hybrid model because the final prediction is not a sin-
gle continuous-valued probabilistic output but an ensemble
output. Details of experiments will be discussed latter.
We further provide technical study of our approach. We
investigate the performance of building the random forests
from different layers of the DNNs. We find that the relative
`2 distance between the real examples and the corresponded
adversarial examples serves as good indicator to determine
the depth of DNN layers that the random forests best grow
upon. With careful examination and ablative study, experi-
ments show our models not only defend against the attacks
successfully but also achieve a high classification accuracy
on the original test instances.
Below we summarize the key contributions:
• We present a simple, flexible, and intuitive technique
to enhance the security of DNN classifiers against ad-
versarial attacks.
• We propose a novel direction for defending from
gradient-based attacks. We utilize random forests to
transform pure DNNs into non-differentiable classi-
fiers thus prevent the gradient from being inferred
which is the strategy that state-of-the-art attacking
models typically rely on.
• Extensive experiments show the effectiveness of our
model against some strong attackers in both white-box
and black-box literature.
2. Related work
Since the concept of adversarial samples comes up,
many attack and defense methods have been proposed. In
this section, we describe recent developments related to this
topic, including both adversarial attacks and adversarial de-
fense approaches.
2.1. Adversarial attacks
White-box attacks. White-box means attackers have
the full access of the architecture, parameters and weights
of the model [32, 7, 14]. One of the first methods is pro-
posed in [32], known as box-constrained L-BFGS, which
minimizes the additive perturbation based on the classifi-
cation constrains. Then, Goodfellow et al. proposed an
approach called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [14]
to conquer the inefficiency. Later, Basic Iterative Method
(BIM) method [19] is introduced to add perturbations iter-
atively. In 2017, a very strong attack [7] (a.k.a. C&W)
method is proposed to find the minimal L0, L2, and L∞
distance. There are also generative network based attacking
methods. For example, [2] generates adversarial samples
through generative adversarial networks [13]. It is note-
worthy that Kantchelian proposes an attack method on tree
ensemble classifiers [16]. However, the approach handles
regression trees while we use classification trees, while the
authors also propose that the attack of tree classifiers can be
easily solved with adversarial training.
Black-box attacks. Compared to white-box attack
methods that request the target neural networks to be dif-
ferentiable, black-box attacks are introduced to deal with
non-differentiable systems or systems whose parameters
and weights cannot be reached. Zeroth Order Optimization
(ZOO) [8] can directly estimate the gradients of the target
network through zeroth order stochastic coordinate descent.
Papernot et al. propose [28] to achieve decision bound-
aries learning based on transfer attack. And Liu et al. [21]
use an ensemble of several pre-trained models as the source
model to generate adversarial examples even when no query
of probes are allowed.
2.2. Adversarial defenses
Defenses based on gradient masking. Gradient mask-
ing is one of the most popular defense methods that inten-
tionally or unintentionally mask the gradient that is needed
for computing perturbations by most white-box attackers.
Buckman encodes input images using thermometer encod-
ing to enable discrete gradient that cannot be attacked di-
rectly [6]. While Guo applies transformation to the inputs
to shatter the gradients [15]. By adding noise to the logit
outputs of neural networks, Nguyen introduces the masking
based defense against C&W attacks [27].
Defenses through adversarial training. Adversar-
ial training is one of the most straightforward and effi-
cient strategies when defending against the adversarial at-
tacks [32]. However, adversarial training only improves the
robustness of some specific attacks [24, 4]. For some strong
attack methods like [7], it is very hard to gain robustness via
adversarial training because of large search space. It is ob-
served that by adding noise before starting the optimizer for
the attack [22], the over-fitting towards specific attacks can
be reduced and ensembling adversarial samples generated
by different models also improves robustness [33].
Other defenses. There are also other defense methods
that fall into none of the two categories above. Metzen
defends against attacks through refusing classification by
detecting whether there are signs of tampering of the in-
put [23]. Goodfellow uses shallow RBF that is robust to
adversarial samples but has a much lower accuracy on the
clean samples [14]. Some other methods try to apply pre-
processing techniques towards the input to denoise before
the classifier such as JPEG compression [10] and median
filter [34].
3. Our Approach
To adversarially attack deep neural networks (DNNs),
the most effective existing methods are almost gradients-
based (e.g. [7, 14]) probably because the DNNs are usually
trained by (stochastic) gradient descent. As a result, to de-
fend DNNs against such attacks, gradient masking has be-
come the main idea behind recent defense methods [6]. It
means that although the gradients exist in the deep models,
they could be hidden from the attackers. However, such de-
fenses fail once attackers find some ways to approximate
the gradients [1]. We first introduce our methdology, then
summarize the the two streams of attack models we used to
examine our method.
3.1. Model
We design a defense approach with a completely differ-
ent strategy instead. By incorporating a standard CNN clas-
sifier with a random forest into a robust classifier, we in-
tegrate the merit of neural networks in extracting abstract
and informative features and the advantage of non-gradient
based classifiers. In practice, our hybrid model is achieved
through a two-stage training procedure. We first train a
DNN classifier, with back-propagation from cross-entropy
loss, then discard the last few layers in the DNNs and re-
place them with a random forest (e.g. built with classifica-
tion trees) to work as a non-differentiable classifier. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates our approach. It could be understood as
attaching random forests upon a well-trained DNN feature
extractor. Thanks to the powerful feature extractor and
the expressive capabilities of random forests, our approach
achieves almost the same accuracy as the original DNN
classifier on the testing sets. Meanwhile, it disable white-
box attacking methods to compute gradients through such
a hybrid model. We show in experiments that our hybrid
model is also robust to the transfer attacks which we pro-
poses as the ultra white-box attack.
In formal, we introduce our hybrid model. To re-purpose
pre-trained DNNs as feature extractors [12], a straightfor-
ward implementation is to use output from the penultimate
layer. However, in practice directly stacking a random for-
est after the penultimate layer yields poor performance. To
address this problem, we propose a passive strategy to iden-
tify the proper layer of the DNNs from which we grow the
random forests. We find that after adding a small pertur-
bation to the input, there is a difference for the relative `2
distance between the original samples and the correspond-
ing adversarial samples generated by the C&W attack af-
ter each activation, which means that different layers in the
DNNs have different amplifying ability towards the pertur-
bation. The average relative `2 distance of the kth layer is
calculated based on:
Dk =
1
|M |
M∑
i=1
‖a(k)i − a˜(k)i ‖2
‖a(k)i ‖2
(1)
where M denotes the number of images, a(k)i and a˜
(k)
i de-
note the activation of the ith original input xi and the cor-
responding adversarial example x˜i at the kth layer of DNN
F , respectively.
Using `2 as the criterion, we keep as many layers as pos-
sible at the beginning from the input layer until we reach the
one that causes significantly larger distortion than the other
layers. Our experiments in Section 4 demonstrate that this
criterion is effective, allowing the resulting hybrid model to
achieve a high classification accuracy and meanwhile to be
robust against the transfer attacks or black-box attacks.
Afterwards, we use the output of the (k−1)th layer of the
DNN F , while k denotes the layer with the largest relative
`2 distance between the original samples and the adversarial
samples, as the input of the random forests. We build our
random forests with classification trees by following the ap-
proach in [9]. For each split in each tree, we compute the
split score S through:
S = G(L) +G(R) (2)
whereL andR denote the left and right per-class probability
count vector, respectively. The idea is to calculate the Gini
impurity to give the lowest split score S. The Gini impurity
is calculated by:
G(C) = 1−
J∑
j
(
Cj
Nc
)2, Nc =
J∑
j
Cj (3)
where there are J classes andCj denotes the number of sam-
ples classified into the jth class. The problem can be solved
through Hoeffding tree [11]. Let Ph denote the output of the
hth classification tree and suppose there are H trees in the
random forests. The final predictions of sample x in our hy-
brid model becomes the ensemble of the classification trees:
Pf (j|x) = 1
H
H∑
h=1
Ph(j|Fk−1(x)) (4)
where Fk−1 denotes the output of the (k− 1)th layer in the
DNN F , j is the jth class and H is the number of trees in
the forest.
Next, we introduce the two categories of white-box and
black-box attacks we mainly focus against in experiments.
3.2. Defending against white-box attacks and trans-
fer attacks
White-box attacks are the most powerful adversarial at-
tacks. However, by stacking the random forests, the hy-
brid model becomes non-differentiable and the conven-
tional white-box attackers cannot get meaningful results by
attacking the hybrid model because there is no way of back-
propagating gradients through random forests. Besides, to
further demonstrate the robustness of the hybrid model, we
also propose a attack setting named ultra white-box attack.
In the ultra white-box attack setting, not only our our hybrid
Figure 1. An overview of our approach. We build a hybrid model through three steps: First we identify the proper layer of growing the
random forest by locating the kth layer in the DNN which has the biggest amplifying ability with Equation 1. Then we dispatch the DNN
from the kth layer and connect a random forest to imitate the classification ability of the DNN and dissolve the gradients to avoid being
attacked by the adversarial attackers.
model but also the original DNNs upon which our model is
built are released to attackers. Therefore, the ultra-white-
box attackers will be able to generate adversarial exam-
ples for our end-to-end differentiable DNNs through gradi-
ent methods and transfer the attacking results to our hybrid
model. The setting is based on the observations that adver-
sarial examples have remarkable transferabilities [21, 32]:
given two neural networks trained for solving the same
problem, the adversarial examples generated for one neu-
ral network can also successfully attack the other.
In the white-box attacks experiments, a strong white-box
attack, C&W attack, is used to conduct the experiments.
Specifically, we use their most efficient `2 attack.
3.3. Defending against black-box attacks
We also discuss the robustness of our model against the
black-box attacks since black-box attackers should be able
to attack any model without access to the gradients. As
there are countless number of black-box attack methods
and we would not be able to test all of them, we therefore
categorize the existing black-box attacks into the following
three representative groups. Then in each group, a represen-
tative and latest method is selected to test the effectiveness
of our method.
Gradient estimation One of the most efficient category
is gradient estimation based methods that use various tech-
niques to estimate the unknown gradients of the target
model [8, 25, 3]. We choose ZOO [8] out of this category
in our experiments as it is one of the strongest black-box at-
tack methods. ZOO achieves almost the same success rate
as white-box attacks by estimating the gradients of the tar-
get network through the zeroth-order stochastic coordinate
descent.It is worth pointing out that there is no ground-truth
gradients at all in our hybrid model. However, ZOO still
tries to attack it by the zeroth-order gradients. As a result,
our approach is experimentally shown hard to be attacked
by ZOO.
Decision-based attacks The decision-based attacks are
black-box methods that solely rely on the final decision
of the model [26, 4]. As a representative decision-based
method, Boundary Attack [5] achieves a comparable attack
performance with one of the best gradient-based attacks [7]
in both targeted and untargeted scenarios which literately
modifies a random sample from the target class to be visu-
ally similar to the original sample.Boundary Attack is hard
to be defended because one of the pre-requisites of the al-
gorithm is to maintain the target classification. Therefore,
the attack success rate would always be 100% although the
generated adversarial samples might be quite different from
the original samples. During the experiment, we use the `2
distance to evaluate the performance of the attack and de-
fense.
Table 1. The average relative `2 distance between adversarial and original samples
Activation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
MNISTnet 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.30 0.60 - - - - - - - -
AlexNet 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.43 0.50 0.62 - - - - - - -
VGG-16 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.45 0.51 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.65
Training a substitute model While knowing the num-
ber of target classes, the attackers could train a substitute
DNN to mimic the behavior of the model. Ideally, the sub-
stitute DNNs shares the same decision boundaries as the
target model and the adversarial samples generated by the
substitute DNNs would be able to fail the target network as
well. We use the recent Practical Black-Box Attack method
proposed in [28] to test our defending approach against this
type of methods.
4. Experiments
Our experiments are conducted on CIFAR-10 [17] and
MNIST [20] dataset, following the previous experiment
protocols [7, 8]. We pre-process all the images by re-scaling
the pixel values to the range [-0.5, 0.5]. For all of the exper-
iments on CIFAR-10, we use two popular neural networks
VGG-16 [30] and AlexNet [18] as our backbone networks.
For MNIST, we use the architecture proposed in the C&W
attack [7], i.e., a 7-layer convolutional neural network and
we denote it as MNISTnet in our following experiments. In
the testing stage, we also follow the C&W attack and use
the first 1000 originally correctly classified images from the
test set to evaluate the success rate of the attack.
We consider the untargeted attack for the substitute
model method [28] and targeted attack for the other meth-
ods. In the targeted attack, we use all the 9 classes in turn
except for the ground truth class as the target class for each
image and calculate the average attack success rate over all
the target classes. For the ZOO and ultra white-box attacks,
margin κ [7] is set to zero. In our experiments, we use the
attack success rate (i.e. ASR) to measure the effectiveness
of different attacks (or, our defense). ASR is calculated as
the percentage of the adversarial examples that are success-
fully classified to the target classes by the attacks out of all
examples tested. Additionally, we also include `2 distance
in most of our experiments [7, 8], which is calculated us-
ing the mean squared distance between the original images
and the adversarial images. We find that a random forest of
300 trees and 10,000 nodes gives rise to the best trade-off
between the classification accuracy and the defense perfor-
mance on CIFAR-10. However, to save computational cost,
we use 300 trees and 10,000 nodes for AlexNet and 300
trees and 1,000 nodes for VGG-16 in our experiments. For
AlexNet, we keep the first five layers as the feature extrac-
tor and, for VGG-16, we grow the forest from the 8th layer.
For the neural network applied to MNIST, we use 10 trees
and 1,000 nodes taking as input the activations of the 6th
layer.
4.1. Finding the proper layers to grow the random
forests
To find the most suitable layer to grow the random
forests, we use the relative `2 distance (Equation 1) defined
in Section 3.1 as our criterion. In this experiment, we ran-
domly select 1,000 originally correctly classified images out
of the validation sets to evaluate the relative distortion be-
tween the original samples {x} and the adversarial samples
{x˜} generated by the C&W attack. Since the amplifying
ability of each activation is different, the relative growth of
`2 distance between each two activations changes. To our
surprise, the relative `2 distance grows slowly in both the
first layers and the last few layers for AlexNet and VGG-
16, while on the contrary, faster in some intermediate layers
as shown in Table 1.
Recall that our original intention of building the hybrid
model is to take advantage of the strength of the represen-
tation power of DNNs as feature extractor, the experimen-
tal results declare the fact that each layer in the neural net-
works plays a different role (e.g. the bottom layers extract
low level features and the top layers in charge of the classi-
fication). Then the different role of each layer result in the
different ability of the layer to manipulate the adversarial
distance. It turns out the intermediate layers in AlexNet and
VGG-16 have best of the ability to generate the adversari-
als. Hence we are safe to replace the top layers which are
responsible to classification with the random forest which
has no gradient. The distance also grows differently in dif-
ferent networks (MNISTnet and others), which also request
special dispatch point in distinctive networks.
We therefore choose to grow the random forests after
the one with the largest relative growth which is the 6th
for MNISTnet, 5th for AlexNet and 8th for VGG-16 after
trade-off between the defense performance and the classifi-
cation accuracy. The selection turns out to be effective in
the following experiments. The ablation study of the ultra
white-box performance while growing random forests from
different layers is shown in Section 5.3.
4.2. White-box attacks and transfer attacks
We use the C&W method as the white-box attack meth-
ods following the setting of the original paper [7]. As men-
tioned before, directly attacking our hybrid model gives 0%
attack success rate. And our model also has a very low
transferability in the ultra white-box setting. Since there’s
no counterpart in the original DNNs for comparison with
our ultra white-box setting, we also test the regular trans-
fer attacks in which we generate adversarial samples on one
network(i.e. AlexNet) and test the accuracy of the gener-
ated adversarial samples on another network(i.e. VGG-16
and our AlexNet hybrid model) The results are shown in
Table 2. For this and the following tables, we denote accu-
racy as ’acc’ and attack success rate as ’ASR’.
Table 2. Results of the white-box and transfer attack
Acc% ASR% Ultra%
AlexNet dnn 83.4 100 100ours 82.7 0.0 4.8
VGG-16 dnn 93.5 100 100ours 90.6 0.0 9.7
MNISTnet dnn 99.2 100 100ours 98.4 0.0 4.4
Compared to the 100% attack success rate achieved in
the original DNNs, the C&W attack barely succeeds in one
single attack to our hybrid models as shown in the 4th col-
umn of Table 2. Besides, testing the transferability on the
same DNNs is meaningless, we just keep it as 100% for
comparison. After making it a hybrid model, we achieves
a transfer attack success rate of 4.8%,9.7% and 4.4% on
AlexNet, VGG-16 and MNIST, respectively. Thus we can
safely claim that even if we release the architecture and
weights of both our original neural network and the hybrid
network, our approach can still successfully defend against
the current strongest white-box attack.
4.3. Black-box attack: ZOO
Since the comparison is already significant enough, in
the experiment of the Zeroth Order Optimization (ZOO) at-
tack [8] we only run 1,500 iterations to attack the original
neural networks but 15,000 iterations to attack our hybrid
model to save computational time. For MNIST, we did not
re-produce the experiment but directly include the result re-
ported in their paper as the same network is used. The re-
sults are shown in Table 3.
In terms of the classification accuracy, our hybrid models
are on a par with the original neural networks; the absolute
decreases are only 0.5% 2.9% and 1% for AlexNet VGG-
16 and MNISTnet, respectively. In terms of the defense
performance, the hybrid models are much better than the
original neural networks. For AlexNet, the attack success
Table 3. Results of defending against the ZOO attack [8]
Network Acc% ASR% `2 distance
AlexNet dnn 83.2 89.7 8.79ours 82.7 5.4 37.2
VGG-16 dnn 93.5 86.8 9.89ours 90.6 3.6 38.1
MNISTnet dnn 99.2 98.9 2.0ours 98.2 0.9 185.2
rate (i.e. ASR, the lower the better) decreases from 89.7%
to 5.4% with an average `2 distance between the original in-
put examples and the adversarial examples increasing from
8.79 to 37.2 (the higher the better from the defense perspec-
tive). The same observation also happens to VGG-16 and
MNISTnet, where the ASR decreases from 86.8% to 3.6%
and from 98.9% to 0.9% with an average distance increas-
ing from 9.89 to 38.1 and from 2.0 to 185.2, respectively.
Thanks to our hybrid defense method that has about the
same classification accuracy as DNNs, we can safely claim
that the strong black-box attack method, ZOO, fails.
4.4. Black-box attack: Decision-based attack
For decision-based attack [5], we test 100 samples from
the testset that have been correctly classified by our model.
For each example with label l, we set the target label as
(l + 1) mod 10. For each example, we set the maximum
number of steps to be 100, where very few steps are already
sufficient to demonstrate the difference between our model
and the original. In each step, the length of the total per-
turbation δ and the length of the step  towards the original
input are initially set to 0.1 and 1.0, respectively, as sug-
gested by [5]. In each δ step, 5 orthogonal perturbations
are generated compared with 10 in the original paper. Our
results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Results attacked by Decision Based Attack Model [5]
Network Acc% `2 dist Time (s)
AlexNet dnn 83.2 4.58 1.84ours 82.7 5.87 61.2
VGG-16 dnn 93.5 5.66 2.57ours 90.6 5.74 46.0
MNISTnet dnn 99.2 16.6 0.86ours 99.2 11.1 5499.6
Since the decision-based method follows the rule that
the target classification must been maintained, it makes no
sense to compare the attack success rate. Instead, we com-
pare the `2 distance of the generated adversarial samples
through attacking the DNNs and our hybrid models and the
attack time. The longer the attack time and the `2 distance,
the poor the attack. Our results are shown on Table 4.
4.5. Black-box attack: Practical Substitute Model
Recall that the substitute model in [28] only conducts ex-
periments on MNIST. We expand their experiment setting
to CIFAR-10 by re-adjusting the parameters. To compare
adversarial attacks on CIFAR-10, we set learn rate = 0.001.
In addition, we increase the number of seed samples from
150 to 1500. The substitute model is also enhanced, specif-
ically, we use VGG-16 as the substitute model for AlexNet
and AlexNet as the substitute model for VGG-16. We use
learning rates 0.001 and 0.0001 for AlexNet and VGG-16,
respectively. We train the model with 5 data augmentations,
each for 50 epochs, which is 1 data augmentation less than
the original experiments in [28] since the number of train-
ing samples grow exponentially with each data augmenta-
tion process and the seed training set is already 10 times
larger compared to the original experiments. And for the
experiment of MNIST, we use the same setting as the origi-
nal paper, which means  is set to 0.4. The results are shown
in Table 5. ”Acc” and ”Acc:sub” denote the accuracy of the
original and the substitute model respectively.
Table 5. Results attacked by Practical Substitute Model [28]
Network  Acc% Acc:sub% ASR%
AlexNet
0.03 dnn 83.2 45.6 19.2ours 82.5 44.1 19.8
0.1 dnn 83.2 45.5 47.2ours 82.5 43.0 44.9
VGG-16
0.03 dnn 93.5 42.8 13.1ours 90.5 44.4 12.5
0.1 dnn 93.5 42.1 70.3ours 90.5 40.1 69.7
M-net 0.4 dnn 99.2 70.1 45.7ours 98.7 78.1 43.1
In Table 5, ASR denotes the performance of our defense
of untargetd attacks, as only untargeted attacks are involved
in [28]. It represents that the generated adversarial samples
cannot be correctly classified by our hybrid model after the
attack. It can be found from the experiment that it is very
hard to train a substitute model on natural images especially
when the model is complex. Therefore we also test when
 = 0.1 where  is the perturbation magnitude preset for the
FGSM attack [14] which in most cases,  is set to 0.031.
Among the three categories of black-box attacks, our hy-
brid model also performs well qualified. It either decreases
attack success rate or increase `2 distance, or attack time.
To the best of our knowledge, there are very few research
that have done a wholesome attack towards a single de-
fense method from white-box to black-box attacks, from
directly attacks to transfer attacks, and gain a satisfying per-
formance on almost all of the experiments.
5. Technical study
In this section, we perform technical studies to quantify
the details of our designs including the effect of parameters
involved in our model, the influence of adversarial training,
and the difference of the depths of DNN layers that the ran-
dom forests build on. Specifically, we re-train our approach
using different parameters in the random forests and DNNs,
and demonstrate the results after adversarial training.
5.1. Effectiveness of adversarial training
To investigate whether adversarial training helps, we im-
plement two kinds of experiments to verify this issue, as
shown in Table 6. In the first experiment, we train the
original DNNs with the adversarial samples generated from
C&W attack and PGD attack [22], respectively, and then
generate two new hybrid models. Then we test the two
new hybrid models using the ultra white-box attack. It can
be found from Table 6 that adversarial training on original
DNNs does not affect the attack success rate too much but
the average distortion increases.
Table 6. Results of adversarial training
Adv train Acc% ASR% Distortion
None 83.4 32.8 0.44
Hybrid: C&W 81.1 33.5 0.69
Hybrid: PGD 79.4 33.9 0.52
Random forest 83.2 16.2 0.44
In the second experiment, for a hybrid model, we tune
its random forest by the adversarial samples generated from
C&W attack. Then we test the tuned hybrid model again us-
ing the ultra white-box attack. The attack success rate drops
since the random forests already learns the adversarial sam-
ples. To better observe the experiment difference, only the
last few fully connected layers are deprived and replaced by
random forests. The experiment is conducted on AlexNet
and all the attack success rates are calculated based on the
ultra white-box settings.
5.2. Parameters in the random forests
We only tune two parameters of the random forests, i.e.,
the number of trees and the number of max nodes in each
tree. We test the number of trees between 10 to 300 and the
number of max nodes between 100 and 10000. The param-
eters are tested using grid search and the results are reported
with respect to the performance of the ultra white-box task.
Table 7 shows the results on AlexNet where the substitution
is conducted from the 5th layer and VGG-16 where the sub-
Table 7. Results of the ultra white-box attack with different number of trees and nodes
Trees Nodes AlexNet VGG-16 MNISTnet
Acc ASR Hyb acc Trans Acc ASR Hyb acc Trans Acc ASR Hyb acc Trans
10 100
83.4 100
74.2 10.7
93.5 100
83.1 14.2
99.2 100
94.0 9.1
10 1000 77.7 8.2 86.4 13.0 97.1 8.3
10 10000 77.8 8.9 86.8 12.3 97.8 7.6
100 100 80.5 6.2 87.9 11.8 96.4 7.1
100 1000 81.9 6.2 89.8 11.6 97.8 5.6
100 10000 82.6 5.8 90.4 10.4 98.2 4.5
300 100 80.8 6.6 88.3 10.7 96.3 6.5
300 1000 82.3 5.3 90.1 11.1 97.7 5.1
300 10000 82.7 4.8 90.6 9.7 98.4 4.4
Table 8. Results when starting the substitution from the second-last and the best activation
Trees Nodes AlexNet VGG-16
From 7th activation From 6th activation From 14th activation From 7th activation
Hybrid acc Trans Hybrid acc Trans Hybrid acc Trans Hybrid acc Trans
10 100 81.4 36.1 74.2 10.7 93.4 48.6 69.2 9.0
100 1000 83.3 37.1 81.9 6.2 93.5 55.2 81.8 6.6
300 10000 83.3 36.9 82.7 4.8 93.6 57.3 84.4 5.6
Table 9. Results when starting the substitution from different layers (AlexNet)
Trees Nodes After the conv After activation After Pooling After Batchnorm
Hybrid acc Trans Hybrid acc Trans Hybrid acc Trans Hybrid acc Trans
10 100 72.8 13.0 74.2 10.7 75.9 17.7 76.0 16.6
100 1000 81.8 9.8 81.9 6.2 82.1 10.7 82.2 11.2
300 10000 82.6 10.6 82.7 4.8 83.0 10.9 82.9 10.9
stitutition is conducted from the 8th layer. The activation
layers are numbered from the bottom layers to top layers.
It can be found that the more trees and nodes we have,
the higher the performance of our hybrid network achieves
on the original testset, and the lower transferrability the hy-
brid network has. Basically, the defense performance grows
with the performance of the hybrid model. This turns out to
be a very pleasant trend since some existing defense mod-
els increase the robustness of their systems but at the cost of
the drop of the accuracy [14]. However, when the number
of parameters grows, the system turns out to be slower and
requires more computing resources. We utterly choose 300
trees and 10000 nodes to attain the proper performance and
speed within our hardware capabilities.
5.3. From which layer to grow random forests
Theoretically speaking, we can substitute the neural net-
work from any layer. But actually, the starting layer matters
regarding the final performance of our model. Using the
proposed criterion defined in Section 4.1, we find starting
from the layer that has the largest gap of relative `2 distance
from its prior layer gains a better transferability than the
penultimate layer, which is shown in Table 8.
We also investigate the impact of max pooling and batch
normalization layers. We conduct the experiment after the
6th activation of AlexNet, where there are 4 layers includ-
ing convolutional, activation, max pooling and batch nor-
malization. Table 9 shows the best performance is achieved
after the activation layer.
6. Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work
considering using models with no gradients to defend ad-
versarial attacks, probably because of the poor performance
of non deep learning methods on high-level tasks (e.g. im-
age classification). While in our paper, we propose a sim-
ple hybrid model to overcome the drawbacks of individual
DNNs and random forests. Through comprehensive experi-
ments, we demonstrate that our proposed method is very ef-
fective for defending both white-box (including ultra white-
box attack) and different kinds of black-box attacks. Sim-
ple but advantageous, our approach provides a preliminary
evidence in support of the effectiveness of hybrid models,
shedding lights on a promising direction to pursue.
References
[1] A. Athalye, N. Carlini, and D. Wagner. Obfuscated gradients
give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to ad-
versarial examples. In Proceedings of the 35th International
Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2018, July 2018.
[2] S. Baluja and I. Fischer. Adversarial transformation net-
works: Learning to generate adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1703.09387, 2017.
[3] A. N. Bhagoji, W. He, B. Li, and D. Song. Exploring the
space of black-box attacks on deep neural networks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1712.09491, 2017.
[4] B. Biggio, I. Corona, D. Maiorca, B. Nelson, N. Sˇrndic´,
P. Laskov, G. Giacinto, and F. Roli. Evasion attacks against
machine learning at test time. In Joint European conference
on machine learning and knowledge discovery in databases,
pages 387–402. Springer, 2013.
[5] W. Brendel, J. Rauber, and M. Bethge. Decision-based ad-
versarial attacks: Reliable attacks against black-box machine
learning models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.04248, 2017.
[6] J. Buckman, A. Roy, C. Raffel, and I. Goodfellow. Ther-
mometer encoding: One hot way to resist adversarial exam-
ples. In Submissions to International Conference on Learn-
ing Representations, 2018.
[7] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness
of neural networks. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2017 IEEE
Symposium on, pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
[8] P.-Y. Chen, H. Zhang, Y. Sharma, J. Yi, and C.-J. Hsieh. Zoo:
Zeroth order optimization based black-box attacks to deep
neural networks without training substitute models. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence
and Security, pages 15–26. ACM, 2017.
[9] T. Colthurst, D. Sculley, G. Hendry, and Z. Nado. Tensor-
forest: scalable random forests on tensorflow. In Machine
learning systems workshop at NIPS, 2016.
[10] N. Das, M. Shanbhogue, S.-T. Chen, F. Hohman, L. Chen,
M. E. Kounavis, and D. H. Chau. Keeping the bad guys out:
Protecting and vaccinating deep learning with jpeg compres-
sion. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.02900, 2017.
[11] P. Domingos and G. Hulten. Mining high-speed data streams.
In Kdd, volume 2, page 4, 2000.
[12] J. Donahue, Y. Jia, O. Vinyals, J. Hoffman, N. Zhang,
E. Tzeng, and T. Darrell. Decaf: A deep convolutional acti-
vation feature for generic visual recognition. In International
conference on machine learning, pages 647–655, 2014.
[13] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu,
D. Warde-Farley, S. Ozair, A. Courville, and Y. Bengio. Gen-
erative adversarial nets. In Advances in neural information
processing systems, pages 2672–2680, 2014.
[14] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explain-
ing and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[15] C. Guo, M. Rana, M. Cisse´, and L. van der Maaten. Coun-
tering adversarial images using input transformations. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1711.00117, 2017.
[16] A. Kantchelian, J. Tygar, and A. Joseph. Evasion and harden-
ing of tree ensemble classifiers. In International Conference
on Machine Learning, pages 2387–2396, 2016.
[17] A. Krizhevsky and G. Hinton. Learning multiple layers of
features from tiny images. 2009.
[18] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton. Imagenet
classification with deep convolutional neural networks. In
Advances in neural information processing systems, pages
1097–1105, 2012.
[19] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial exam-
ples in the physical world. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533,
2016.
[20] Y. LeCun, L. Bottou, Y. Bengio, and P. Haffner. Gradient-
based learning applied to document recognition. Proceed-
ings of the IEEE, 86(11):2278–2324, 1998.
[21] Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song. Delving into trans-
ferable adversarial examples and black-box attacks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1611.02770, 2016.
[22] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and
A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to adver-
sarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.
[23] J. H. Metzen, T. Genewein, V. Fischer, and B. Bischoff.
On detecting adversarial perturbations. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.04267, 2017.
[24] S. M. Moosavi Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard. Deep-
fool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural
networks. In Proceedings of 2016 IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), number
EPFL-CONF-218057, 2016.
[25] N. Narodytska and S. Kasiviswanathan. Simple black-box
adversarial attacks on deep neural networks. In 2017 IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Workshops (CVPRW), pages 1310–1318. IEEE, 2017.
[26] B. Nelson, B. I. Rubinstein, L. Huang, A. D. Joseph, S. J.
Lee, S. Rao, and J. Tygar. Query strategies for evading
convex-inducing classifiers. Journal of Machine Learning
Research, 13(May):1293–1332, 2012.
[27] L. Nguyen and A. Sinha. A learning and masking approach
to secure learning.
[28] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks against machine
learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, pages
506–519. ACM, 2017.
[29] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. The limitations of deep learning in adversar-
ial settings. In Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), 2016 IEEE
European Symposium on, pages 372–387. IEEE, 2016.
[30] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman. Very deep convolutional
networks for large-scale image recognition. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1409.1556, 2014.
[31] Y. Song, T. Kim, S. Nowozin, S. Ermon, and N. Kushman.
Pixeldefend: Leveraging generative models to understand
and defend against adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.10766, 2017.
[32] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan,
I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[33] F. Tramr, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh,
and P. McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks
and defenses. In International Conference on Learning Rep-
resentations, 2018.
[34] W. Xu, D. Evans, and Y. Qi. Feature squeezing: Detecting
adversarial examples in deep neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.01155, 2017.
